Making evidence and policy in public health emergencies: Lessons from COVID-19 for adaptive evidence-making and intervention. by Lancaster, Kari et al.
1
Evidence & Policy • vol xx • no xx • 1–14 • © Policy Press 2020   
Print ISSN 1744-2648 • Online ISSN 1744-2656 • https://doi.org/10.1332/174426420X15913559981103  
Accepted for publication 05 June 2020 • First published online 24 June 2020
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which 
permits adaptation, alteration, reproduction and distribution for non-commercial use, 
without further permission provided the original work is attributed. The derivative works do not need to be 
licensed on the same terms.
debate
Making evidence and policy in public health 
emergencies: lessons from COVID-19 for adaptive 
evidence-making and intervention
Kari Lancaster, k.lancaster@unsw.edu.au
University of New South Wales, Australia
Tim Rhodes, tim.rhodes@lshtm.ac.uk
University of New South Wales, Australia
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK
Marsha Rosengarten, m.rosengarten@gold.ac.uk
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK
Background: In public health emergencies, evidence, intervention, decisions and translation 
proceed simultaneously, in greatly compressed timeframes, with knowledge and advice constantly 
in flux. Idealised approaches to evidence-based policy and practice are ill equipped to deal with the 
uncertainties arising in evolving situations of need.
Key points for discussion: There is much to learn from rapid assessment and outbreak science 
approaches. These emphasise methodological pluralism, adaptive knowledge generation, 
intervention pragmatism, and an understanding of health and intervention as situated in their 
practices of implementation. The unprecedented challenges of novel viral outbreaks like COVID-
19 do not simply require us to speed up existing evidence-based approaches, but necessitate new 
ways of thinking about how a more emergent and adaptive evidence-making might be done. The 
COVID-19 pandemic requires us to appraise critically what constitutes ‘evidence-enough’ for 
iterative rapid decisions in-the-now. There are important lessons for how evidence and intervention 
co-emerge in social practices, and for how evidence-making and intervening proceeds through 
dialogue incorporating multiple forms of evidence and expertise.
Conclusions and implications: Rather than treating adaptive evidence-making and decision making 
as a break from the routine, we argue that this should be a defining feature of an ‘evidence-making 
intervention’ approach to health.
Key words public health emergencies • decision making • evidence-making  
intervention • COVID-19
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Key messages
• COVID-19 necessitates new ways of thinking about emergent evidence-making.
• Emergencies open up questions about what constitutes ‘evidence-enough’ for rapid decisions 
in-the-now.
• Rapid assessment and outbreak science models offer indications of how evidence-making 
might be done differently.
• Adaptive evidence-making is needed not only during emergencies but also for intervening in 
the everyday.
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As the COVID-19 pandemic is making abundantly clear, the relationship between 
evidence and policy decision making during times of emergency is crucial. With 
COVID-19, there is the imperative to act, swiftly, to contain the virus and slow the 
spread. But in these unprecedented conditions, faced with a novel coronavirus, it 
is all the more apparent that evidence is uncertain, emergent and evolving. In the 
absence of empirical data we become even more reliant on other ways of generating 
and synthesising evidence, forecasting the possible effects of interventions rather than 
trialling their situated outcomes. We become aware that we cannot act with the same 
sense of certainty about ‘what works’. Moreover, there is limited time for ‘business-
as-usual’ processes of research translation, as new evidence of ‘unprecedented’ events 
comes to hand. Interventions are required in the immediate present, and at scale. 
Policy decisions are rapidly made, rarely definitive, and revised almost daily in the 
context of heightened social, economic and political concern. Emergencies speed 
up and challenge the ideal processes of evidence-based policy and practice such that 
evidence, translation, decision making, and intervention implementation proceed 
simultaneously, in greatly compressed timeframes, and in situations with complex, 
intersecting social, economic and political pressures.
COVID-19 opens up urgent questions about the nature of evidence and evidence-
based decision making in health, especially what constitutes ‘evidence-enough’ when 
intervening in the face of the unknown. Although the pandemic throws these questions 
into sharp relief, we suggest that these are concerns not only for crisis periods but also 
for evidence-making and intervening in the everyday. Decision makers routinely deal 
with degrees of uncertainty and are often aware that although evidence is necessary for 
action, intended outcomes are without guarantee. Thus, building on rapid assessment 
and outbreak science approaches, we suggest that the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic 
challenges us to further consider the need for adaptive modes of evidence-making 
and intervention in health.
Towards adaptive evidence-making
The imagined ideals of evidence-based policy and practice in health are especially 
challenged in situations of urgency. This is the case given the simultaneous 
co-production of evidence and response in emergency situations. In the field of health 
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there remains a preference for scientific evidence derived via controlled intervention 
designs which seek to isolate an intervention’s causal effects from the context of 
its implementation, and systematic reviews of these, to judge the effectiveness of 
interventions. Even in situations where evidence from controlled intervention studies 
is not available, evidence-based health policy and practice generally proceeds on 
the assumption that evidence must first be generated so that it can subsequently be 
translated into decisions about implementing interventions at scale (NICE, 2014). 
Evidence, policy and implementation are idealised, at least in theory, as separate and 
distinct sites, with the ‘gaps’ between them needing to be ‘bridged’ via the careful 
translation of evidence ‘into’ practice.
An established body of work demonstrates that the ideals of evidence-based policy 
and intervention are much messier and more complex in practice (Oliver et al, 2014). 
This ideal fits awkwardly with the fluid and ambiguous practices of policy work 
(Colebatch et al, 2010), and there are continuing disagreements about what constitutes 
‘good’ evidence (Green, 2000; Cairney, 2017). While there is a push to develop 
approaches that smooth the bumpy interface between evidence, decision making 
and implementation, as well as to rethink concepts like ‘translation’ (Greenhalgh 
and Wieringa, 2011), the cyclical resurgence of calls for ‘robust’ evidence for policy 
(Haynes et al, 2012) highlights the ongoing challenge of broadening definitions of 
‘what counts’ as evidence and how that evidence is used (Lancaster et al, 2017b).
While the ideal of evidence-based policy and practice might be cast as ‘illusory’ 
(Smith-Merry, 2020: 3), in the health field ‘there appears to be a reluctance to let go’ 
(Smith, 2013: 4). Public health emergencies profoundly challenge these aspirations 
to ‘hold on’ and bring to light the urgent need for different ways of thinking. The 
COVID-19 pandemic, as with other viral outbreaks and public health emergencies, 
requires evidence-making and decision making able to deal with an evolving situation 
where evidence and response are engaged in a simultaneous process of co-production. 
A recent review on evidence-informed decision making in infectious disease outbreaks 
noted it is ‘not a disregard of evidence that put a strain on decision making in various 
contexts, but rather the lack of clear, unambiguous and rapidly available evidence for 
risk characterisation and effectiveness of response measures’ (Salajan et al, 2020: 14). 
As such, it was suggested that there might be a need to ‘re-evaluate the status quo’ 
(Salajan et al, 2020: 14) and bring knowledge to bear in different ways. In effect, 
crisis contexts highlight the need to think differently about evidence-making and 
decision making, acknowledging that unambiguous evidence in evolving situations 
of complexity is an unachievable ideal, and that the effectiveness of response measures 
is situated and emergent.
Rapid assessment models have been developed to attempt to speed up – and 
importantly bring together – the processes of evidence-making and decision making 
in situations of complex public health and humanitarian emergencies (Manderson 
and Aaby, 1992; Rhodes et al, 1999; WHO, 1999; Trotter et al, 2001; Fitch et al, 2004). 
Since the 1990s, these methods have been used successfully around the world to 
generate data for decision making in the management of HIV/AIDS, substance use, 
family planning, malaria, tuberculosis, diarrheal disease, dengue fever, water sanitation, 
and disaster intervention. These methods orientate towards intervention development, 
using multiple data sources, the continual triangulation of data, cyclical processes of 
inductive hypothesis formation and testing, an investigative orientation akin to ‘the 
detective novel’, and active participation of local communities and non-scientific 
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experts in research and interventions (Rhodes et al, 1999: 66). The focus is explicitly 
on undertaking assessments in order to respond, developing interventions and not 
merely knowledge, especially when inadequate data are available. A systematic review 
conducted following the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlights the 
value of such methods for identifying and addressing context-specific issues, acting as a 
guide for resource allocation, and providing data to plan long-term assistance (Johnson 
and Vindrola-Padros, 2017). Outbreak science has also been proposed to improve 
epidemic preparedness and emergency response. Outbreak science focuses on turning 
data into ‘actionable information for decisions’ by maximising how models, clinical 
knowledge, laboratory results, data science and statistics can be put to use to support 
decisions regarding resource allocation and the implementation of interventions both 
during, and between, disease outbreaks (Rivers et al, 2019). As with rapid assessment, 
it has been said that outbreak science requires ‘a paradigm shift’ (Rivers et al, 2019: 3) 
in the ways that evidence makers and decision makers work together.
We suggest that rapid assessment and outbreak science models offer indications 
of how evidence-making might be done differently, including via an emphasis on 
methodological pluralism, intervention pragmatism, and understanding health in its 
local social, cultural and economic situation. These models seek to adapt the ‘ideal’ 
of evidence-based approaches by mixing different forms of evidence, reconfiguring 
notions of ‘validity’ and ‘reliability’, and by giving value to iteration, and to emergence 
over succession. What differentiates these models from traditional approaches to 
generating evidence for decision making is not merely that they move quickly from 
‘assessment’ to ‘response’, but that they implicitly recognise ‘the process of assessment 
as the beginning of the response itself’ (Greig and Kershnar, 2000: 25, emphasis original), 
thus breaking down an imagined separation between evidence and intervention, 
knowledge and response, knowledge producers and users. Such approaches open 
up evidence and expertise by making evidence and intervention through dialogue 
between scientists, decision makers and communities, enabling responses in-the-
now; entangling present, situated, social and political concerns into the co-production 
of evidence and decisions. They are evidence-making practices orientated towards 
being responsive to an evolving situation of need. Following this path, we suggest that 
the unprecedented challenges of COVID-19 do not simply require us to speed-up 
existing evidence-based approaches, but rather necessitate different ways of thinking 
about how a more adaptive evidence-making can not only contribute to addressing 
uncertainties, but do so in a manner responsive to an emergent and evolving situation. 
We emphasise that this requires an openness to forms of evidence and expertise often 
absented from ‘business-as-usual’ evidence-based intervention.
Evidence-enough
In emergencies, generating and translating evidence to inform action is conceived as 
a race against time. In the case of COVID-19, epidemic preparedness analyses were 
quickly troubled, with the implementation of containment strategies both uncertain 
and unpredictable, including in countries with state of the art health care (Dalglish, 
2020). Early in the pandemic, the Global Research Collaboration for Infectious Disease 
Preparedness (2020) noted that there are ‘many unknowns’ about COVID-19 and 
its optimal management, but nonetheless specified that there was an urgent need to 
develop ‘safe and effective countermeasures’. The need for immediate intervention 
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means that decisions have to be made in the absence of knowledge and are often 
subject to revision. This prompts questioning of what constitutes evidence, and, more 
specifically, ‘evidence-enough’, for decision making in-the-now.
The events which unfolded on the Diamond Princess in February 2020 are a 
prime case. As the site for one of the first outbreaks of COVID-19 outside of China, 
the ship gained notoriety for poorly enforced and inadequate quarantine conditions. 
Infectious disease specialist Professor Kentaro Iwata posted a YouTube video giving a 
detailed account of the ‘completely chaotic’ conditions on board, outlining suggestions 
for immediate changes to prevent transmission (Iwata, 2020). The Diamond Princess 
subsequently became a case for epidemiological investigation (Zhang et al, 2020). 
But the question we raise is how observational evidence produced by experts in the 
moment, and disseminated via non-traditional avenues, might constitute ‘evidence-
enough’ for iteratively altering intervention strategies in emergencies. Retrospectively, 
we can see how Professor Iwata’s account might have been taken up as evidence and 
used rapidly in a situation of uncertainty and emergent decision making. Another case 
example relates to the calculation of COVID-19 deaths in Wuhan. As many people 
died at home, without being diagnosed with, or treated for, COVID-19, official 
estimates of the death toll were brought into question. In the face of uncertainty, social 
media was mobilised to calculate the number of deaths based on cremation capacities 
of funeral homes, and the number of urns distributed to local families, triangulating 
these data with available official counts to generate estimates (Radio Free Asia, 2020). 
These examples point to the strength of different forms of observation being brought 
into triangulation as decision making happens in a compressed timescale, rather than 
preferencing data generation and intervention designs that proceed successively over 
longer periods. More broadly, and in the everyday, these case examples draw attention 
to the multiple forms of expertise, modes of observation and evidencing which are 
already present, and which might have been noticed at the time, or retrospectively, 
and brought into inventive triangulation, were it not for sometimes blinkered and 
delimiting preferences for particular evidence-making practices.
During times of crisis, when there is an imperative to act, the question becomes what 
can be done in light of the limitations of what can be known for now. As governments have 
scrambled to respond effectively and in time, it has become clear that absent evidence 
and indecision are as consequential as apparently certain knowledge and action. The 
urgency of the crisis has meant that expertise has been brought to bear in new ways. 
The thing we call ‘evidence’ is being enacted in a different mode, authorised, validated, 
and made legitimate through non-traditional platforms and practices, with judgements 
about its relevance for policy entangled within the evolving situation and urgent 
matters of concern. Dr Richard Horton, Editor in Chief of The Lancet, has taken to 
the media to strongly critique the inaction of the UK government (Horton, 2020b) 
and opened up the Direct Messaging function of his Twitter account to receive, and 
rapidly disseminate, ‘evidence from the NHS COVID-19 frontline’ (Twitter, 2020a) 
stepping out from behind the usual authorising practices of ‘objective evidence’ and 
peer review. Dr Michael Ryan, WHO Executive Director of Health Emergencies, has 
implored, ‘Be fast. Have no regrets.… Speed trumps perfection’ (News.com.au, 2020). 
In the absence of empirical evidence of transmission dynamics and intervention effects, 
modelled projections fill gaps in what can be known, generating multiple scenarios 
to inform decisions (for example, Ferguson et al, 2020). In this context, researchers 
have also questioned the enduring value of concepts such as internal validity, and 
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suggested that there is a need to think with external validity to learn from different 
diseases in different times (Twitter, 2020c). How historical and anecdotal evidence 
from the US urban experience of the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic might be used 
to inform the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions now, despite 
the vast differences across time and socioeconomic contexts, has been considered 
(Ebrahim et al, 2020). What evidence exists is also being translated at breakneck speed. 
As member of the Oxford COVID-19 Evidence Service Professor Trisha Greenhalgh 
tweeted on March 21, ‘Please can we all now stop saying “it takes 17 years to get 
research evidence into practice and policy”. This week, I’ve seen observational studies 
and rapid reviews done in days, which have changed policy in minutes and practice 
in hours’ (Twitter, 2020b).
Policy debates surrounding asymptomatic transmission, and in particular the 
question of facemasks, offer another case example of how evidence is being enacted 
in a different mode. Given inadequate supplies of certified masks for healthcare 
workers, members of the community were initially discouraged from wearing 
facemasks. Amidst scientific debates about the effectiveness of various types of masks, 
the WHO issued advice stating that ‘there is not enough evidence for or against the 
use of masks (medical or other) for healthy individuals in the wider community’ 
(WHO, 2020). Faced with ‘mixed’ evidence, the UK government prevaricated saying 
it would be ‘guided by the scientists’ (BBC News, 2020b). Despite systematic reviews 
concluding that there was insufficient evidence to strongly support the widespread 
use of facemasks, researchers pushed back on these policy decisions. Invoking the 
‘precautionary principle’ researchers argued that limited anecdotal, indirect and 
circumstantial findings ought not to be ignored, given the seriousness of COVID-
19 and the consequences of inaction (Greenhalgh et al, 2020). They argued that ‘in 
the face of a pandemic the search for perfect evidence may be the enemy of good 
policy’ (Greenhalgh et al, 2020). Here, the assessment of ‘evidence-enough’ for action 
was made in context, in relation to a hinterland of other matters of political, social 
and economic concern (including the desire to reduce the period of lockdown). For 
such conclusions to be drawn in the pages of a peer-reviewed clinical journal such 
as the BMJ is also notable. But this invocation need not only be conceptualised as 
a weighing of the evidence, for and against, in an interim of uncertainty. As we have 
argued elsewhere (Rosengarten et al, 2020), masks may also be regarded not as a 
finite solution but as a possible in the midst of numerous uncertainties; a pragmatic 
response to a situation where evidence of situated effect can only come after (and 
potentially too late). In these unprecedented times, there is an opportunity to rethink 
what constitutes ‘evidence-enough’ to inform decision making, and how expertise 
and response might be brought to bear in novel ways. Following the path of rapid 
assessment and outbreak science approaches, we can consider anew how prioritising 
‘what can be done’ might drive approaches to emergent and adaptive evidencing and 
create possibilities for responsive and iterative intervention.
Entangled evidence and interventions
Emergent and adaptive evidence-making is not simply a question of speed, or 
merely about shifting the boundaries of what constitutes ‘evidence-enough’ to 
act fast in the moment. The COVID-19 pandemic also demonstrates the need for 
a reflexive, responsive and adaptive science for decision making that recognises 
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that evidence and interventions are each and all entangled, emerging through the 
situated relational dynamics involved in their accomplishment, constituted within 
the particular social and political practices and processes of their implementations 
(Rhodes and Lancaster, 2019; Rosengarten and Savransky, 2019). Evidence-based 
approaches in health tend to hold onto the idea of isolating an intervention’s effects 
from its context and, moreover, attempt to trial individual interventions successively 
to know ‘what works’ (Savransky and Rosengarten, 2016; Rhodes and Lancaster, 
2019). In an evolving situation, as we are witnessing with COVID-19, it becomes 
clear to see that interventions are not isolatable not only from their situated contexts 
of implementation but also from each other; it is not practical to successively trial 
the effectiveness of individual interventions (especially social distancing and other 
non-pharmaceutical interventions such as business closures, lockdowns and travel 
bans). Take for example mathematical modelling released in the UK on March 16 
outlining the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions to reduce COVID-19 
mortality and healthcare demand. In that report, the uncertainty of assumptions about 
intervention effectiveness was signalled: ‘Disentangling the relative effectiveness of 
different interventions from the experience of countries to date is challenging because 
many have implemented multiple (or all) of these measures with varying degrees of 
success’ (Ferguson et al, 2020: 14). The caveat noted here reveals the limitations of 
the assumptions underpinning evidence-based approaches in times of emergency, but 
also more generally. As the pandemic progresses and country-specific data become 
available, there have been attempts to ‘untangle’ the effects of various social distancing 
measures (Gibney, 2020). However, attempts to evaluate these data to know ‘what 
works’ fail to appreciate the situated nature of an effect, or how such an appreciation 
might alter assumptions about generalisation that continue to underpin evidence-based 
approaches (Rosengarten and Savransky, 2019). The entanglement of interventions 
in their situations of implementation is ever present (Rhodes and Lancaster, 2019). 
However, emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic make this more visible, 
as emergencies fuse this ever present complexity with reduced time. This raises the 
question of how complexity can be navigated, through time and iteratively, when 
there is the imperative to act fast.
Decisions
The inextricable entanglement of interventions with their social and political worlds 
of implementation has implications for decision making. Evidence-informed decisions 
‘cannot be isolated from the political environments in which those decisions are 
taken’ (Salajan et al, 2020). All health interventions are situated in complex social and 
political worlds, but public health emergencies highlight these entanglements given the 
urgent imperative to act in the moment. In the case of COVID-19, despite continued 
claims to be ‘following the science’ it is abundantly clear that ‘evidence’ comes to bear 
in varied ways in different contexts. The variation in government responses around 
the world is testament to this (Hale et al, 2020). Appeals to evidence are decidedly 
political (Parkhurst, 2017). We can already see that public health is by no means the 
only matter of concern driving decision making and the timing of interventions. The 
public health imperative to preserve life and limit transmission of the virus butts up 
against social, legal, trade, economic, ethical, and human rights concerns. Decisions 
to close borders, implement travel bans, prohibit large gatherings of people, limit 
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freedom of movement, lockdown communities, or mandate quarantine (with criminal 
penalties for non-compliance) may all have compelling public health arguments but 
carry with them major and unpredictable economic and social consequences, altering 
our very ways of life.
Quarantine and self-isolation measures are an example. It has become evident 
that implementing quarantine and self-isolation rapidly and decisively is critical to 
containing the spread of COVID-19. However, these decisions generate multiple 
consequences, not only for viral transmission but for populations, institutions, 
businesses, and communities. Quarantine and self-isolation are complex interventions, 
incorporating biomedical, social, ethical, legal, economic and political concerns. 
This is apparent in the variations in national responses which balance enforced and 
voluntary controls in the face of ongoing spread (Hale et al, 2020). Past outbreaks, 
including Ebola, tell us that quarantine decisions are not easy, and can generate ill 
effects, even precipitating community resistance to viral control (Johnson and Vindrola-
Padros, 2017). However, as the UK modellers of suppression and mitigation strategies 
noted in their report: ‘we do not consider the ethical or economic implications of 
either strategy here, except to note that there is no easy policy decision to be made’ 
(Ferguson et al, 2020). In emergencies, it becomes difficult to hold onto the notion 
that evidence generated to inform decision making can somehow stand apart and 
separate itself from the social and political worlds in which it is made and will be 
put to use. When evidence and decision making are proceeding simultaneously, 
these matters of concern are even more obviously inescapably conjoined, requiring 
processes of reflexive dialogue and engagement which work to actively incorporate 
these concerns and values quickly and decisively, rather than maintaining a veneer 
of scientific objectivity. There is a tendency to try to side-step the complexity of 
these entanglements, and act as if evidence can be generated in ways that reflect 
ideal ‘business-as-usual’ assumptions, rather than seeking to adapt the model of how 
we do and situate evidence-making practices. The question becomes, how much 
complexity can be folded into decision making? The need to negotiate complexity 
and emergence in the moment, prompts a much more ‘event’ orientated evidence-
making intervention approach (Rhodes and Lancaster, 2019), rather than one that 
sees adaptation as a series of steps, or abductions, moving towards knowledge for 
decision making.
Experts
Emergency conditions also highlight that policy decision makers ought not to be the 
only target for evidence translation when rapid community responses are required. 
We have seen an explosion of social media communication between scientists, 
mathematical modellers and clinicians, seeking to report emerging data and give advice 
in real time (Rhodes et al, 2020). The evidence-based paradigm held up as ideal in 
health policy decision making largely assumes that interpretation of evidence will be 
institutionally-led (through government, other authorised decision-making bodies, 
or, as in the tradition of evidence-based medicine, by those regarded as possessing 
legitimate expertise). Approaches to knowledge translation, brokerage and research 
impact have been developed with policy makers, bureaucrats and professionals as 
their focus. But COVID-19 highlights the recursive and continuous communication 
between scientists and communities, with translation and interpretation of evidence 
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proceeding in alternative fora, in ways that challenge the notion of research translation 
as a linear step to ‘bridge’ evidence and policy. Arguably, the sheer size of the response 
has elicited a deep desire amongst publics to know more about the basis of the decisions 
that so profoundly affect their lives. There has also been heightened public scrutiny 
of the processes and practices through which evidence and expertise come to bear, 
including questioning of the disciplinary and demographic make-up, transparency, 
and personal integrity of government expert advisory groups (public attention in 
the UK resulted in the resignation of a government advisor, and the establishment 
of an ‘independent’ Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies: BBC News, 2020a; 
Horton, 2020a). Again, a key tenet of rapid assessment is a flatter ontology of expertise, 
seeking to produce evidence in dialogue with community and others, including as 
part of the way ‘triangulation’ is done in decision-making moments (Rhodes et al, 
1999). Drawing on these approaches, we can rethink not only how we make evidence 
which is situated within social and political worlds, but also decision making and 
governance, and the ways in which evidence makers can inform these processes, 
especially in evolving situations of complexity.
Dialogue
COVID-19 demands dialogue because of the nature and scale of the community-
based interventions required and the political circumstances in which this outbreak 
is occurring. In the absence of pharmaceutical solutions, decision makers are reliant 
on the untested potential of large-scale community-based non-pharmaceutical 
interventions which rely on communication, public engagement and trust to 
implement them effectively (Ebrahim et al, 2020). If or when a vaccine becomes 
available, public engagement and trust will also be crucial. However, this global health 
emergency is occurring at a time when the relationship between science, expertise, 
politics and publics is highly contentious. Amidst an enduring political atmosphere 
of ‘fake news’, diminished trust in government and what has been regarded as failed 
political leadership on a range of issues (Brexit, the Australian bushfire emergency, 
and climate change, to name a few) there is a public desire for information. Media 
outlets have stepped in where governments have been seen to fail, providing daily 
updates for example tracking the spread of COVID-19 across states and nations (ABC 
News, 2020). The COVID-19 HealthMap provides another example (HealthMap, 
2020). HealthMap crowdsources and rationalises large volumes of data into a single 
global dataset, making these data open and accessible to the research community and 
publics. There has been a public ‘thirst for maths and models’ as a means to knowing 
COVID-19, precipitating an emerging genre of ‘outbreak communication’ and 
‘citizen modelling science’ (Rhodes et al, 2020: 254). How scientists can work more 
closely with communities and practitioners, rather than thinking primarily in terms of 
translation of evidence for decision makers via expert committees and behind closed 
doors, is an issue which is already being partially put into practice and is deserving of 
further consideration. Knowledge controversies and crises such as COVID-19 have 
potential to become ‘generative events’ in which expertise can be redistributed, and in 
which ‘the inventiveness of social scientists comes to the fore in the design and conduct 
of research practices that stage more and different opportunities for new knowledge 
polities to emerge’ (Whatmore, 2009: 588, 596). Building on the insights offered in 
rapid assessment approaches, the key point here is not to find ways to ‘bridge’ science 
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and affected communities through knowledge exchange or brokering as traditionally 
conceived, but rather to see evidence-making as entangled and situated within those 
communities, generating knowledge and responses with and for those communities 
simultaneously and in time.
Although public participation in science, as well as in policy decisions involving 
scientific and technical claims, has become a hallmark of democratic governance, 
the privileging of particular kinds of knowledge within evidence-based policy and 
practice produces tensions about the role of publics and the relative value of other 
ways of knowing (Lancaster et al, 2017a; Smith-Merry, 2020). Sheila Jasanoff has argued 
that with respect to complex problems we need ‘not only high-quality technical 
analysis but also the institutions of community and trust that will help us frame the 
appropriate questions for science. To serve as a basis for collection action, scientific 
knowledge has to be produced in tandem with social legitimation’ (Jasanoff, 1996: 69). 
Furthermore, she argues, ‘the task ahead then is to design institutions that will promote 
trust as well as knowledge, community as well as participation – institutions, in short, 
that can repair uncertainty when it is impossible to resolve it’ (Jasanoff, 1996: 69). 
Evolving situations such as we are witnessing with COVID-19 highlight the stark 
need for new modes of social organising, and the potential affordances of dialogue 
between evidence makers, decision makers, and the communities they serve. How 
such collective modes might be fostered during a crisis characterised by the need 
for physical distancing is a challenging question, but essential for effective responses.
Conclusion
The urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic prompts consideration of how decisions 
might be made, in ways that are responsive, in light of the limitations of what can be 
known. It throws into sharp relief the need for more nuanced understandings of what 
constitutes ‘evidence-enough’, and how it might be taken up rapidly via novel means 
of translation as decisions are iteratively made and revised. This requires acknowledging 
the entanglements of evidence and interventions in their social worlds, and highlights 
the need for dialogue between evidence makers, decision makers and publics.
Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the WHO, has said, “We need 
our collective knowledge, insight and experience to answer the questions we don’t 
have answers to, and to identify the questions we may not even realize we need to ask”. 
This requires a different kind of thinking about the relationship between evidence and 
decision making. Rapid assessment and outbreak science models have foreshadowed 
how evidence-making might be done differently for intervention during times of 
emergency. Generating reflexive and adaptive approaches to evidence-making and 
rapid intervention, in dialogue with decision makers and communities, during times 
of emergency outbreak is essential when little is known and when evidence and action 
are proceeding simultaneously. These lessons are not only for crises, however. Too 
often, as emergencies subside, we return to the ideal of evidence-based approaches. 
But we suggest that these moments illuminate the possibilities and affordances of an 
emergent and adaptive evidence-making, not only during health emergencies but 
for intervening in the everyday (Rhodes and Lancaster, 2019). By treating evidence, 
decision making and interventions as co-affective rather than as if independent, we 
might attend to outcomes beyond those anticipated in an evidence-based approach. 
The crisis around COVID-19 evidence provides an opportunity for reimagining a 
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different sort of relation between science, policy and intervention and, by consequence, 
enables more reflective approaches to knowing and doing interventions in health.
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